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On April 25, 1988, the United States Supreme Court, with four justices
dissenting, entered an unusual order, restoring Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union1 to the oral argument calendar and requesting supplemental
briefs on the question "whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 adopted. . . in Runyon v. McCrary2 should be reconsidered." ' The
parties in Patterson, like Congress4 and both courts below, had not ques-
tioned the general principle articulated in Runyon, that Section 1981'
t Member of the Illinois and Massachusetts Bars. Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. The
author would like to thank Neil H. Cogan, Harlon L. Dalton, Murray Dry, Stanley N. Katz, Jeffrey
T. Shaw, and Winnifred F. Sullivan, all of whom provided useful comments on an earlier draft of this
essay, and Brian Blanchard, whose research assistance was indispensable. Since this essay is a com-
mentary, and not a work of original historical research, the author obviously is indebted to those
whose original works are relied upon here. In addition, the author wishes to acknowledge his indebt-
edness to the excellent briefs filed in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
1. 108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988). Barbara Patterson, a black woman, was employed for ten years as a
teller and file coordinator by McLean Credit Union. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d
1143, 1144-45 (4th Cir. 1986). Following her discharge, she filed an action against her former em-
ployer under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), alleging that she had been harassed because of her race during
her employment and subjected to racial discrimination, both in connection with promotions and at the
time of her discharge. 805 F.2d at 1144. She also brought a pendent state law claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Id. With respect to her racial harassment claim, Patterson alleged that
McLean's president had told her at hiring that her co-workers would not like her because she was
black, and that he subsequently made a practice of giving her too much work, singled her out for
criticism at staff meetings, and required her to do sweeping and dusting, tasks not required of white
tellers. Id. at 1145. On one occasion, he told her that blacks were known to be slower than whites. Id.
The district court directed a verdict for McLean, both on the Section 1981 harassment claim and on
the pendent state claim; the jury returned a verdict for McLean on the Section 1981 promotion and
discharge claims. Id. at 1144. After the Fourth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide: (1) Whether a claim for racial harassment may be maintained under Section 1981, and (2)
Whether the plaintiff in a Section 1981 promotion case must prove that she was better qualified than
the person who received the promotion. 108 S. Ct. 65 (1987). These questions were argued orally on
February 29, 1988. Neither court below questioned Patterson's right to bring her promotion and
discharge claims under Section 1981.
2. 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Section 1981 not only prohibits official discrimination in making of con-
tracts, but also reaches private conduct, such as activities of private school).
3. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 1419.
4. See infra notes 26 and 32 and accompanying text (Congress frequently overrules court opin-
ions, but has not responded to Runyon with curative legislation).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) provides in relevant part:
All persons ... shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
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prohibits racial discrimination by private parties. The Court acted entirely
on its own motion in raising this question as to the continued validity of
its own precedent. In doing so, the Court signalled its intention to look
back, not only to 1968, when it held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.6
that Section 1982' reached private discrimination,8 or to 1976, when it
explicitly extended that holding in Runyon to cover Section 1981, but also
to 1866, when Congress first enacted these sections.9 Thus, the Court's
order warrants revisiting the legal history of Reconstruction.10
I. INTRODUCTION
At the outset, it is well to remember that reconstructing the past is
perilous work. As H. Jefferson Powell has reminded us, most matters of
historical interpretation necessarily involve probabilities, not certainties."
The past can never be completely accessible to us, but we can judge his-
torical assertions according to whether they are more probable than not,
or more likely to be true than competing assertions.' This principle ap-
plies not only to our assertions about the great questions of history, but
also to the small corners in which lawyers and judges struggle with ques-
tions of legislative intent.
In some cases, legislative intent may be so clear as to obviate any need
for discussion, let alone litigation. In many cases, however, Congress' in-
tent is not obvious. Indeed, as two recent cases illustrate, congressional
intent sometimes may be unclear even with respect to questions which, at
least in retrospect, appear so basic as to cry out for answer.1 In Cannon
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
6. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Section 1982 prohibits racial discrimination by land developer in sale of
property).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) grants to all citizens "the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
8. 392 U.S. at 442.
9. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (reenacted by the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 13, 16
Stat. 140, 144 (1870)) (codified in Revised Statutes of 1874, §§ 1977-1978 (1875), recodified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1982)). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted, over President Johnson's
veto, in April 1866. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1857-61 (1866).
10. Reconstruction historiography has undergone a significant transformation in the past quarter
century. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION xix-xxvii (1988); S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECON-
STRUCTION POLITICS 1-6 (1968); Weisberger, The Dark and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction His-
triography, 25 J.S. HIST. 427-47 (1959).
11. Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 678-83 (1987).
12. Id.; see also I. BERLIN, HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY 46-48 (1954); M. BLOCH, THE HISTO-
RIAN'S CRAFT 54-60 (Putnam trans. 1953); G. HIMMELFARB, THE NEW HISTORY AND THE OLD 17
(1987).
13. See McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 795 (1981).
In some circumstances, of course, the problem may stem, not from the fact that Congress has failed to
express its intent, but from the fact that Congress did not act with one intent, preferring, for political
reasons, to leave some issues for resolution by the courts. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES
OF THE LAW 172 (1921) ("But when a Legislature has had a real intention, one way or another, on a
point, it is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises as to what its intention was."). In the
nineteenth century, however, courts were expected to resolve important public policy questions that
we now consider more appropriate for legislative resolution. See infra note 122.
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v. University of Chicago,1' the Court confronted the question whether
Congress intended to create a private right of action when it enacted Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.15 Likewise, in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,6 the Court confronted the question
whether Congress intended to recognize an implied right of action when it
amended the Commodity Exchange Act17 by enacting the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Act of 1974.18 Despite the recent vintage of
these enactments, and the voluminous legislative materials which the mod-
ern Congress typically creates in the course of legislating,1" specific evi-
dence of congressional intent was virtually non-existent. Thus, the Court
was required to decide both cases by resort to highly technical canons of
statutory construction.20
The Court's decisions in Cannon and Curran are noteworthy because
they show that legislative history cannot always be deemed a font of cer-
tainty about legislative intent, even with respect to modern enactments. 1
Moreover, a court faces even greater difficulties when it is required to
divine legislative intent from older legislative materials. In that case, the
language may no longer be fully understandable;22 the focus may be on
14. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
16. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
17. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
18. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1982).
19. See generally M. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND
THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1980).
20. Curran, 456 U.S. at 394-95 (finding implied private right of action for customer against
broker in fraud claim under Commodity Exchange Act); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (finding implied
private right of action under Title IX). Among other things, the Court observed in Cannon that it
had "never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly conferred a
right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case." 441 U.S. at 690 n.13; see
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
21. We can take some comfort, however, from the fact that Congress apparently agreed with the
holdings in both cases. See, e.g., Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2322-23
(confirming private right of action for commodities fraud).
22. See, e.g., St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022, 2026-28 (1987) (Court consid-
ers meaning of term "race" in nineteenth century, finding employment discrimination against individ-
ual because of Arab heritage actionable under Section 1981). In addition, our reading of legislative
history must be guided by an understanding of contemporaneous legislative and judicial practice. For
example, we now have a rather detailed system by which courts give differing amounts of weight to
different types of legislative materials. See, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353, 362 n.13 (1986)
(statement of non-members of legislature entitled to no weight); National Ass'n of Greeting Card
Publishers .. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 832 n.28 (1983) (conference reports entitled to "great
weight"); FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (sponsors' statements entitled to
"substantial weight"); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) (oppo-
nents' statements entitled to no. weight). In enacting legislation, Congress therefore acts in accordance
with that system and attempts to compile a legislative record appropriate for judicial consideration.
In the nineteenth century, however, that system did not exist, and judicial recourse to legislative
materials was not even thought to be an appropriate method of statutory construction. In one instance,
Chief Justice Taney explained:
In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be influenced by the
construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place
on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing
amendments that we.e offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses,
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once-burning issues that no longer even smolder (rather than on the nar-
row question that now commands attention); 3 and the larger context in
which the legislation was enacted may be inaccessible."' These considera-
tions suggest that the Court, having once completed the difficult and time-
consuming task of divining legislative intent, normally ought not plow the
same ground again. 5 Ordinarily, the Court should leave well enough
alone, recognizing that Congress can always overrule the Court's errone-
ous reading of history. 6 In Monroe v. Pape,27 a case which required the
and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their
intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the
laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in
which it was passed.
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 318-19 (1897) (same); United States v. Pacific R.R. Co., 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875) (same);
see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 215-16
(1980); Congressional Debates: Can They Be Referred to in Construing Statutes?, 9 WASH. L. REP.
242-43 (1881). At the very least, therefore, it seems clear that legislative intent cannot reliably be
ascertained by applying modern rules of statutory construction to legislation that was enacted when
those rules, being unknown, could have played no part in the legislative process. See Curran, 456
U.S. at 374.
23. Cf Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U.
CHI. L. REV. 502, 533 (1964) ("History does not provide the answers to the problems of today; it
merely helps to frame the questions").
24. See R. LERNER, THE THINKING REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 31 (1987) ("[To put it more cautiously, it is a safer presumption to treat the past, includ-
ing our national past, as different or as possibly even strange. In doing so we reduce the likelihood of
our smoothing away or overlooking whatever might be distinctive in that earlier period. By preserving
some sense of possible alienness, we leave ourselves open to being surprised and even to learning
something."). It is noteworthy in this respect that the dissents in Jones and Runyon both looked to the
Supreme Court's dictum in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883), as an authoritative
construction "almost contemporaneous[] with the passage of the [Civil Rights Act of 1866] .... "
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192 (White, J., dissenting); Jones, 392 U.S. at 451 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
However, no Reconstruction historian could possibly fail to perceive the great changes in society and
public opinion that occurred between 1866 and 1883. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
25. Constitutional construction requires a similar approach, but the enterprise is different in the
sense that an erroneous constitutional interpretation can be cured only by the cumbersome process of
constitutional amendment or by reconsideration by the Court itself. See, e.g., Monaghan, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988); Stone, Precedent, the Amendment
Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 67 (1988). In
constitutional adjudication, therefore, the judiciary must be especially receptive to "'the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning.'" Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974)
(quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
26. In recent years, Congress frequently has overruled the Court on questions of statutory con-
struction, particularly in matters of civil rights enforcement. See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (overruling Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984)); Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (overruling
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (overruling General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)). Indeed, Con-
gress is so vigilant in this regard that it sometimes has overruled lower court decisions before the
Supreme Court has had an opportunity to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 469 U.S. 14,
15 (1984) (new legislation renders moot case involving construction of Freedom of Information and
Privacy Acts).
At the same time, it must be recognized that the Court imposes a substantial and costly burden on
Congress when it requires the legislative branch to overrule a judicial decision, particularly where, as
here, a whole body of case law would have to be codified to restore the law to its prior state. Thus, it
is no answer to say that Congress is free to overrule Patterson if the Court chooses in Patterson to
overrule Runyon.
27. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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Court to construe the phrase "under color of any statute" in Section
1983,28 Justice Harlan stated what must be deemed the litmus test in this
area. Although he would have considered the question involved to be
"very close indeed,"2 if presented as a matter of first impression, Justice
Harlan was persuaded to join the majority based on the authority of
Screws v. United States30 and United States v. Classic." Justice Harlan
stated:
From my point of view, the policy of stare decisis, as it should be
applied in matters of statutory construction, and, to a lesser extent,
the indications of Congressional acceptance of this Court's earlier in-
terpretation, require that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative
history of the 1871 statute that Classic and Screws misapprehended
the meaning of the controlling provision, before a departure from
what was decided in those cases would be justified. Since I can find
no such justifying indication in that legislative history, I join the
opinion of the Court.32
The principal aim of this essay is to show that history does not supply
the quantum of proof required to warrant the overruling of Runyon.33
Indeed, far from showing that Runyon was wrongly decided, the historical
materials provide ample support for the Court's holding that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was intended to reach private, as well as official, dis-
crimination. The Thirty-ninth Congress was little concerned with any
theoretical distinction between public and private action in early 1866, but
was committed to giving effect to the Thirteenth Amendment3  by
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
29. 365 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
31. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
32. 365 U.S. at 192 (footnote omitted). Although the main aim of this essay is to show that the
Court's holding in Runyon is not demonstrably inconsistent with Congress' original intent, it is none-
theless true that "[tlhere could hardly be a clearer indication of [present] congressional agreement with
the view that § 1981 does reach private acts of racial discrimination." Runyon, 427 U.S. at 174-75
(emphasis in original). In numerous contexts, Congress has repeatedly indicated its understanding
that Sections 1981 and 1982 reach purely private discrimination, and it has specifically tailored mod-
ern civil rights legislation to accord with that understanding. See 118 CoNG. REc. 3368-71 (1972);
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1972); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976).
33. In Jones, Justice Harlan undertook only the modest task of "endeavor[ing] to show that [the
1866[ debates do not, as the Court would have it, overwhelmingly support the result reached by the
Court, and in fact that a contrary conclusion may equally well be drawn." Jones, 392 U.S. at 454
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan would have preferred to dismiss the writ as
improvidently granted, because of the then-recent enactment of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601 et seq. (1982). 392 U.S. at 450. It seems unlikely, based on the principle Justice Harlan stated
in Monroe, that he would have found the legislative materials sufficiently clear to warrant overturning
Jones, Runyon, and their progeny.
34. The Thirteenth Amendment, which was ratified on December 6, 1865, provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress Lhall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
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"secur[ing] to all persons within the United States practical freedom."35
The conclusion that Congress intended to reach private discrimination in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 may seem radical at first blush, 3  but the
purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment was itself radical,3 7 and, as one
member of the Thirty-ninth Congress observed, the Civil Rights Act was
With respect to the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court has noted that "It]here has
never been any doubt of the power of Congress to impose liability on private persons under § 2 of
...[the Thirteenth] amendment, 'for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws estab-
lishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not
exist in any part of the United States.'" Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (quoting
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). The Court also noted in Griffin that "the varieties of
private conduct that [Congress) may make . . . civilly remediable extend far beyond the actual impo-
sition of slavery or involuntary servitude." Id.
35. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull); see The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. at 22; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 895-99 (1986) (Thirteenth Amendment as positive law
authority for congressional enforcement of citizens' rights).
36. Commentators have disagreed on whether Congress intended to reach private action under the
Civil Rights Act. Some authorities who have directly addressed the question contend that Congress
intended to reach purely private conduct. See, e.g., R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-
1876, at 112 (1985) (describing view of federal judges during Reconstruction that 1866 Act could be
used to attack private discrimination); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 162-64 (1951); Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizen-
ship, and Civil Rights after the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1987); Kaczorowski, supra note
35; Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969); Nieman, Andrew Johnson, the Freedmen's Bureau, and the Prob-
lem of Equal Rights, 1865-1866, 44 J.S. HIST. 399 (1978); Note, Section 1981 and Private Dis-
crimination: An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024,
1025-33, 1036-39 (1972).
Other authorities have taken the opposite view. See, e.g., H. BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL
RIGHTS: POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 124 (1978); 6 C. FAIRMAN,
THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION: 1864-88, at 1218-60 (1971); D. NIEMAN, To SET THE
LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMAN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at
112-13, 150 n.24 (1979); Belz, The Civil War Amendments to the Constitution: The Relevance of
Original Intent, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 115, 129-33 (1988); Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:
Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1969).
This essay suggests that the historical evidence clearly favors the Runyon holding, and that insuffi-
cient contrary evidence exists to warrant overruling a principle so firmly established as that enunci-
ated in Runyon, its antecedents, and its progeny. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617
(1987) (Section 1981 applicable to union in employee discrimination case); St. Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987) (identifiable classes of persons subjected to intentional discrimination
on basis of ancestry protected against private employment discrimination); General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (intent to discriminate must be proven in Section 1981
case); McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (Section 1981 prohibits discrimina-
tion against whites as well as blacks in private employment); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454 (1975) (follows Jones in dicta, holding that Title VII claim did not toll running of
limitation period on Section 1981 claim); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S.
431 (1973) (Sections 1981, 1982 prohibit community pool from withholding approval of assignment of
membership because of race); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (interpreting
Section 1982 to prohibit community recreation association from withholding approval of assignment of
membership because of race).
37. The question of slavery had exacerbated relations among the states since the framing of the
Articles of Confederation. See Sullivan, Book Review Essay, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 173, 179 n.23
(1988).
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"absolutely revolutionary." 3 In sum, the means which Congress adopted
were commensurate with the evils it perceived.
II. THE GENERAL BACKGROUND
It is a commonplace that the Civil War transformed the Union, but it is
difficult to appreciate fully the extent of that change or the velocity with
which it occurred. It was indeed true, as George Templeton Strong con-
fided to his diary in 1865, that his generation had "lived a century of
common life" since 1861.3 9 In 1857, only nine years before the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Supreme Court had declared that all
persons of African descent belonged to a caste without any rights to citi-
zenship, "the unhappy black race. "40 Moreover, during the Secession
Winter of 1860-61, Congress seriously considered adopting an unamend-
able constitutional amendment which would have preserved slavery in the
South and permitted its extension to the territories.4 As late as July 1861,
a virtually unanimous Congress passed the Crittenden Resolution, af-
firming that the "established institutions" of the Southern states (includ-
ing slavery) were not to be military targets. 2 Throughout 1861, military
commanders closed their camps to fugitive slaves, and even returned them
to their owners.
43
In 1862, however, the Emancipation Proclamation profoundly and irre-
versibly altered the situation. 4 The direct impetus for the Proclamation
may have come from considerations of military necessity."5 Once issued,
however, the Proclamation immediately altered the universe of post-war
political options, and it soon became unthinkable that a peace secured by
Northern victory could include a return to slavery. 6 By December 1863,
38. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (Sen. Morrill); see also id. at 1151-55
(Rep. Thayer) (calling Thirteenth Amendment "a revolutionary measure" and proposed act necessary
"to carry to its legitimate and just result the great humane revolution to which I have referred");
Kaczorowski, supra note 36, at 54 ("evidence ... supports the belief of framers that the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the 1866 statute would bring about revolutionary changes in federal
constitutionalism"); Kaczorowski, supra note 35, at 916 (opponents of Civil Rights Act feared
"revolution worse than the Civil War").
39. 4 THE DIARY OF GEORGE TEMPLETON STRONG 14 (A. Nevins and M. Thomas eds. 1952);
see also D. Corbin, Argument in the Trial of the KKK before the United States Circuit Court,
November Term 1871, Columbia, South Carolina 4 (1872) ("Gentlemen, we have lived over a cen-
tury in the last ten years").
40. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856) (citizen has property right in
slaves, which extends into territory under protection of federal government).
41. H. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECON-
STRuCrION ON THE CONSTrIrnON 40-46 (1973).
42. Id. at 172; E. FONER, supra note 10, at 4-5.
43. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 4-5.
44. 12 Stat. 1267 (1863) (slaves in Confederate states to be "forever free" as of January 1, 1863).
45. The order was based on Lincoln's powers as Commander in Chief and paved the way for the
enlitment of blacks in the Union army. See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW 253-55 (1982); H. JAFFA, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 140-68 (1965).
46. H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 264.
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as Lincoln noted, slavery had become a "moral impossibility. ' 47 That
view was confirmed by the election returns of 1864, which brought to
Congress a group of Republican leaders deeply committed to a genuine
Reconstruction.48
The circumstances changed again, however, with Lincoln's assassina-
tion and Johnson's succession to the presidency. Beginning in May 1865,
Johnson embarked on a policy of Presidential Reconstruction that proved
"an unexpected tonic" to white Southerners.4 Almost immediately, "relief
at the mildness of Johnson's terms for reunion mingled with defiant talk
of state rights and resistance to black suffrage," as "[w]hite Southerners
appreciated that Johnson's Reconstruction empowered them to shape the
transition from slavery to freedom and define blacks' civil status without
Northern interference."5 As Southern whites regained social and govern-
mental control under Johnson's Reconstruction policies, they severely re-
stricted the Freedmen's access to the ordinary civil rights and liberties
which white men enjoyed.5'
By the time Congress met in December 1865, the Thirteenth Amend-
ment had been ratified, but "it was apparent that policies which white
Southerners thought showed a willingness to accept emancipation
threatened in Republican eyes to make a mockery of Thirteenth Amend-
ment liberty, if not actually to restore slavery. '"52 Under the leadership of
Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, the Joint Committee of
Fifteen on Reconstruction was formed to monitor and react to conditions
in the South, and to ensure that Johnson's narrowly conceived view of
Northern victory did not carry the day.5" Among members of Congress,
there was no groundswell of support for black suffrage in December
1865,"' but there was increasing recognition that Johnson's policies did
not go far enough. For Johnson, the Civil War had achieved only two
things: the preservation of the Union and the formal destruction of slavery
47. 6 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
189-91 (1969).
48. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 45, at 254-55 (by 1863, "Lincoln and most Ameri-
cans had traveled great moral distances in a short time").
49. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 189.
50. id.
51. H. BELZ, supra note 36, at 114.
52. Id.
53. See generally THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION
(B. Kendrick ed. 1914) [hereinaftei JOURNAL].
Professor Hyman has noted that the Civil War greatly altered the methods which Congress used to
accomplish its legislative business. For example, floor debates decreased in importance as Congress
came to rely increasingly on standing committees. H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 182-83. "[The Civil
War magnified the importance of joint committees generally. Some became standing committees of
particular value for investigating legislation and watchdogging executive operations. These joint stand-
ing committees allowed concentration of information, expertness, and talent and avoided duplication of
effort or energy." Id. at 183.
54. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 245.
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as an institution.55 Johnson could not appreciate that "[t]he restoration of
the Southern States was not enough without a reconstruction of Southern
minds."5 Those whose vision went further, who recognized that the abo-
lition of slavery had created an economic and social vacuum in the South,
and who thus recognized the need for creating a new order, worked
throughout the Reconstruction era to establish new constitutional stan-
dards, craft effective legislation, and deploy federal troops and agents to
abolish all "badges and incidents" of slavery. By the end of 1865, main-
stream Republicanism was increasingly aligned with the campaign for
civil rights for the Freedmen.5"
The Black Codes enacted by the Southern states under Presidential Re-
construction, as well as widespread acts of private discrimination and vio-
lence against the Freedmen, convinced Republican leaders that legislative
action was needed. Those leaders recognized that the abolition of slavery,
having destroyed the labor system that had existed for two centuries in the
Southern states, necessarily called for the creation of a new labor system,
for "the formation of new civil arrangements." '  Indeed, most
Northerners and black leaders saw the free labor contract as a key to
practical freedom.59
Southern whites likewise conceived of the labor question as the driving
issue of public policy. As one Southerner explained to South Carolina
Governor Orr in December 1865, "you will find that this question of the
control of labor underlies every other question of state interest.""0 Former
masters were neither prepared nor disposed to deal with former slaves on
the grounds assumed by free labor ideology. They struggled to recreate
the discipline and control of a slave system, while the Freedmen struggled
to discover freedom as independent workers. In a report released to Con-
gress in December 1865, Major General Carl Schurz observed:
55. JOURNAL, supra note 53, at 152-53.
56. W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1867, at 14
(1963). Indeed, Johnson later became so obsessed with the correctness of his policies that, on one
occasion during his "swing around the circle" in August 1866, "he intimated that Providence had
removed Lincoln to elevate Johnson himself to the White House." E. FONER, supra note 10, at 265.
Johnson's conduct, particularly his veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, alienated many members of
Congress, and pushed Republicans with relatively safe seats into open warfare with him. See gener-
ally L. Cox & J. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE, 1865-1866, at 202, 207 (1963); Kohl,
supra note 36, at 275-76. When Congress eventually overrode Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, it was the first time that Congress had ever overridden a President on a major political issue.
57. L. Cox & J. Cox, supra note 56, at 207.
During the war, a link had been forged between antislavery and the Union cause. Supporters of the
Thirteenth Amendment had hoped that "with chattel bondage abolished and the Negro elevated to
legal and civil equality, the pulsing heart of the system [of slavery] would be stilled and all append-
ages would soon atrophy and disappear." J. TENBROEK, supra note 36, at 149; see also H. HYMAN
& W. WIECEK, supra note 45, at 297.
58. H. BELz, supra note 36, at 48.
59. Id. at 58-64; E. FONER, supra note 10, at 242.
60. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 198 (quoting letter of William L. Trescot to Governor James L.
Orr (Dec. 13, 1865)).
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The general government of the republic has, by proclaiming the
emancipation of the slaves, commenced a great revolution in the
south, but has, as yet, not completed it. Only the negative part of it
is accomplished. The slaves are emancipated in point of form, but
free labor has not yet been put in the place of slavery in point of
fact[.] And now, in the midst of this critical period of transition, the
power which originated the revolution is expected to turn over its
whole future development to another power which from the begin-
ning was hostile to it and has never yet entered into its spirit, leaving
the class in whose favor it was made completely without power to
protect itself and to take an influential part in that development.61
Thus, a principal purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would be to
grant to the Freedmen basic economic rights-to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue and be sued, and to purchase and lease property. These
rights would enable them to act as autonomous, productive workers, who
could hope to accumulate some material wealth. Congress' purpose was
itself revolutionary because it would require a radical reordering of
Southern society.6 2
Introducing the bill that would become the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois stated that the legislation was needed
to reinforce the Thirteenth Amendment: "When it comes to be understood
in all parts of the United States that any person who shall deprive another
of any right or subject him to any punishment in consequence of his color
or race will expose himself to fine and imprisonment, I think such acts
will soon cease."' 3 On the same day, and for related purposes, Trumbull
introduced the bill that would be enacted, after some legislative modifica-
tions and two presidential vetoes, as the Second Freedmen's Bureau Act.6 '
The Act would extend the life of the Bureau and expand its authority to
allow federal agenis to punish those who denied blacks the "civil rights
belonging to white persons.
'"65
61. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1865).
62. It is not difficult to imagine the lack of enthusiasm with which former masters contemplated
the need for dealing with the Freedmen over such matters as wages, when, only a few short years
before, the masters had exercised total dominion over the Freedmen as property which had no legal
rights whatever, even the right to marry. See T. COBB, THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 240
(1858); S. ELKINS, SLAVERY 52-63 (2d ed. 1968); 0. HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER OTIS
HOWARD 279 (1907). Moreover, as Professor Foner has suggested, "[tihe ferment in the countryside,
the history of other societies that had experienced emancipation, and ideologies and prejudices inher-
ited from slavery, combined to convince the white South that only through some form of coerced labor
could the production of plantation staples be resumed." E. FONER, supra note 10, at 198.
63. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).
64. Id. at 129. The language of the two measures was quite similar. See id. at 314-18. See
generally H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 449-59. Significantly, there is no evidence in the legislative
history to support Justice Harlan's suggestion in Jones, that the Freedmen's Bureau bill was intended
to be broader in scope because it included the word "prejudice" as well as "custom." 392 U.S. 409,
462 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. The Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees, and Abandoned Land was established in 1865, as part of
the War Department, to provide relief assistance, legal protection, and land to the Freedmen and to
white persons devastated by the war. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 691 (1865).
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The constitutional amendments and statutes enacted in these years con-
stituted a program to "win the peace" and were viewed as interrelated in
the contemporary mind.6" They also reflected an emerging ideology of
natural rights which, as Representative James F. Wilson observed when
he introduced the Civil Rights bill in the House, "raise[d] by necessary
implication the power in Congress to protect them.""7 Indeed, it has been
suggested that the postwar amendments and statutes, and the broadly con-
ceived efforts of the Freedmen's Bureau, comprised "a sort of nineteenth
century federal welfare" philosophy.6 8 When these enactments are viewed
as a whole, it is impossible to argue that Congress objected, on doctrinal
grounds, to the reaching of private action.69 The era of laissez-faire and
much restricted civil rights opportunities was yet to come."0
III. THE PARTICULAR BACKGROUND
Conventional wisdom once held that the principal objective of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was to nullify the infamous Black Codes that were
enacted in several Southern states during 1865 and early 1866. The cur-
rency of that view has been debased, however, by historical research,
which has shown that the Black Codes were quickly suppressed by the
Freedmen's Bureau and the Union Army. In fact, by the time the Civil
Rights Act was enacted in April 1866, the Codes were largely fair on
66. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Recon-
struction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 992. In 1874, for example, Justice Bradley made the striking com-
ment that the Fifteenth Amendment was "a constitutional extension of the Civil Rights Bill passed in
1866 ...." United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 712 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897),
affd, 92 U.S. 553 (1875).
67. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118-19 (1866); cf Kaczorowski, supra note 36, at
47-48 (congressional Republicans understood Thirteenth Amendment to guarantee "status and natu-
ral rights of citizens").
68. Kohl, supra note 36, at 290.
69. The absence of any such doctrinal objection is demonstrated with particular clarity in both the
Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Section 6 of the Enforcement Act stated:
[I]f two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public
highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free
exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or because of having exercised same, such persons shall be held
guilty of felony ...
Ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act contained similar lan-
guage, also prohibiting private conspiracies to "depriv[e] any person or any class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws ...." Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982)). See
generally Cogan, Section 1985(3)s Restructuring of Equality: An Essay on Texts, History, Progress,
and C~nicism, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 515 (1987).
70. Some would mark the line between the two eras with the Supreme Court's decision in The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). But see United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 369
(E.D. La 1963) (three-judge court) (Wisdom, J.) (by 1879, Louisiana was "firmly in the control of
the White League"). affd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); C.V. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION
204-15 (1951); Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses of History, 60 TUL. L. REV.
314, 33n-31 (1985); infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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their face,7 and typically purported to grant to the Freedmen the techni-
cal, legal rights to buy, sell, own, and bequeath real and personal prop-
erty; to make contracts; to travel freely; to give testimony on oath; and to
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. 2 Nonetheless, it would be an over-
statement to assert that Congress had no concern at all with the Black
Codes (or the possibility that similar laws would be enacted in the future),
and, indeed, such an assertion easily could be disproved by the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act.
73
To be sure, the Black Codes exacerbated problems faced by the Freed-
men. Equally, if not more troublesome, however, was the presence of per-
vasive and entrenched private discrimination. Rooted in the customs and
mores of the white South, private discrimination relegated racial equality
in civil rights to the status of "a mere abstraction recognized technically,
but utterly inoperative to secure [for blacks] the exercise of the cardinal
right of a freeman or citizen. ''7 4 For example, even the right to sue for
breach of contract would have little practical value if the Freedmen gener-
ally were unable to find a lawyer willing to represent them.75 In addition,
the provisions of state law would be of little concern to the Freedman if
the harm that he suffered was not even technically a violation of state law,
as would be the case, for example, when a former master refused to con-
tract with the Freedman at all, agreed to contract with him only on the
most onerous terms, or acted in concert with other former masters to as-
sure that the Freedman was unable to lease or buy land on any terms
whatever. 6
These scenarios play out again and again in the materials before Con-
gress in late 1865 and early 1866, demonstrating that white Southerners
were attempting to reintroduce as much as possible of the institution of
71. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 201; J. SEFTON, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND RECON-
STRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 70-72, 90 (1967).
72. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 45, at 319. Although some Black Codes also included
provisions prohibiting Freedmen from owning firearms, fromliving in certain areas, and from engag-
ing in certain other activities, by and large, the language of the Black Codes was consonant with the
language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Kohl, supra note 36, at 277-78.
73. See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. 409, 455-73 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing concerns
with private action in legislative history of Civil Rights Act).
74. H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 476 (quoting letter from General Oliver 0. Howard to Secre-
tary of War Edwin M. Stanton (Dec. 1, 1866)).
75. Even with a lawyer, the Freedman would have little chance of receiving justice at the hands of
a state judge and jury. A British barrister commented that "the verdicts are always for the white man
and against the colored man." H. LATHAM, BLACK AND WHITE 105 (1867), quoted in E. FONER,
supra note 10, at 204. General Schurz likewise reported that Southern whites, anxious to rid them-
selves of Freedmen's Bureau courts, assured their partisans that opening state courts to the Freedmen
would have no practical effect, so long as all-white judges and juries determined "in each case...
whether the testimony of negro witnesses was worth anything or not." S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1865). "When Schurz objected that, loaded against blacks, state courts were
most unlikely to punish a white abuser of a black employee for assault and battery, he was told: 'You
must make some allowance for the prejudices of our people.'" H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 421.
Thus, the problem was not limited to the facial unfairness of the law, but extended to the partiality of
its administration.
76. See, e.g., H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 431.
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slavery, not only through law, but also through custom and private prac-
tices. Thus, Congress well understood that far more than technical legal
disabilities were at stake."
As a practical matter, the commencement of debate on the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 can be traced to December 1865, when Congress received the
report of Major General Carl Schurz."8 Based on many discussions with
Southern whites, Schurz found widespread commitment to the view that
the Freedmen would not work without physical compulsion, an opinion
which "naturally produced a desire to preserve slavery in its original form
as much and as long as possible. . . or to introduce into the new system
that element of physical compulsion which would make the negro
work." 9 Schurz also described a pattern of private violence "by men who
announce their determination to take the law into their own hands
... "'0 This violence was not random, based on mere racial animosity,
but frequently was aimed at preventing the Freedmen from exercising
their new rights-"calculated to produce the impression among those re-
maining with their masters that an attempt to escape from slavery would
result in certain destruction." 81 Corporal punishment was common, as
was the payment of paltry wages, the latter made possible by the absence
of any true market for the Freedmen's labor.8 2 In addition, Schurz re-
ported that many planters simply refused to pay wages they had agreed to
pay to the Freedmen.8"
77. In Jones, the Court rested its holding in part on Congress' recognition of widespread private
discrimination against the Freedmen, and its intent to remove that discrimination. 392 U.S. at 427-30.
78. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865). Schurz had toured the South, at President
Johnson's request, earlier in the year. He completed his report in November 1865, but Johnson did
not approve its contents and refused to release it until the Senate adopted a resolution insisting that it
be made public. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 78 (1865). When the report was finally
released on December 19, Senator Sumner demanded that it be read aloud because it undermined
Johnson's account of conditions in the South, id. at 79-80, but after a part of it was read, a motion
was made and carried to require that the report be printed. Id. at 80. On January 5, 1866, seventeen
days after the release of the Schurz report, Senator Trumbull introduced the bill that was to become
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 129.
Justice Harlan suggested in Jones that the Schurz report has little importance because it was not
mentioned very often in the debates. Jones, 392 U.S. at 462 n.28 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is beyond
dispute, however, that the Schurz report was the principal resource available to Senator Trumbull
when he drafted the bill. It is also beyond dispute that the matters discussed in the report were
frequently discussed (whether specifically referenced or not) during the debates. See infra note 130
and accompanying text. Thus, an equally (and probably more) plausible explanation is that the report
was seldom mentioned because members of Congress were so familiar with it.
79. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 17.
80. Id. at 18 (quoting report of Brigadier General Fessenden) (emphasis omitted).
81. Id. at 17.
82. Id. at 16, 19-20, 29-30. Schurz wrote:
[M]any attempts were made to . . . adher[e], as to the treatment of laborers, as much as
possible to the traditions of the old system, even where the relations between employers and
laborers had been fixed by contract. The practice of corporal punishment was still continued to
a great extent. . . . The habit is so inveterate with a great many persons as to render, on the
least provocation, the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible.
Id. at 19-20.
83. Id. at 16, 30.
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Significantly, former masters generally did not refuse to contract with
their former slaves, but recognized the use of labor contracts as a means of
reintroducing practical slavery, insisting on terms so onerous as to leave
the Freedmen worse off than they had been under slavery."4 In short,
Schurz found that Southern whites, accustomed to their "peculiar" labor
system, were not able to abide the free labor traditions of the North.
Southern whites would be taken by "a paroxysm of fright," Schurz re-
ported, if the Freedmen were to act "as free laborers in the North act
every day without causing the least surprise.'"" Without federal interven-
tion, Schurz warned, the Freedmen would be subjected to "a system of
coercion, the enforcement of which will be aided by the hostile feeling
against the negro now prevailing among the whites, and by the general
spirit of violence which in the south was fostered by the influence slavery
exercised upon the popular character. ' ' "e Significantly, at the time Schurz
prepared his report, he was not aware of any post-war laws which ad-
versely affected the Freedmen, except for scattered ordinances in Louisi-
ana and Mississippi, which he characterized as "mere isolated cases."
'87
Also before the Thirty-ninth Congress was the report of General Oliver
0. Howard, the head of the Freedmen's Bureau.88 Howard detailed the
widespread use of corporal punishment and cruelty in employment, the
formation of combinations for the purpose of extorting the Freedmen, the
defrauding of the Freedmen of their wages, and the refusal of whites to
fulfill their contracts with the Freedmen.89 Howard offered no particular
criticism of state laws. To the contrary, he noted with approval that two
Southern states had enacted laws permitting blacks to testify in their
courts,9" and he warned of the "danger of the statute law being in advance
of public sentiment.""1 Thus, like Schurz, Howard focused not on techni-
cal legal disabilities, but on practical discrimination effected through the
actions of private parties.
Beginning on January 22, 1866, the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion conducted hearings to examine the conditions prevailing in the South-
84. Schurz wrote:
[Miany ingenious heads set about to solve the problem, how to make free labor compul-
sory. . . . [S]ome . . . planters tried to solve this problem by introducing into the contracts
provisions leaving only a small share of the crops to the freedmen, subject to all sorts of con-
structive charges, and then binding them to work off the indebtedness they might incur. It
being to a great extent in the power of the employer to keep the laborer in debt to him, the
employer might thus obtain a permanent hold upon the person of the laborer.
Id. at 22, 27, 30.
85. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 122 (quoting from Carl Schurz's Letters from the South, 1951
GA. Hisr. Q. 222, 239 (Mahaffey, ed.)).
86. S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 32.
87. Id. at 25.
88. H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
89. Id. at 26-30.
90. Id. at 29.
91. Id. at 33.
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ern states.92 Consistent with the Schurz and Howard reports, the bulk of
the testimony adduced at these hearings concerned abuses by private par-
ties, rather than discriminatory laws or discriminatory acts by public offi-
cials. In general, witnesses testified that the Freedmen were unable to
make labor contracts on fair, non-discriminatory terms, or to buy, lease,
or hold real and personal property, not because of legal disabilities, but
because of private discrimination. For example, Major General A. H.
Terry testified: "Many persons are treating the freedmen . . . with great
harshness and injustice, and seek to obtain their services without just com-
pensation, and to reduce them to a condition which will give to the former
masters all the benefits of slavery ... "1-3
Major General Edward Hatch, who had been stationed in Mississippi
and Alabama after the close of the war, testified:
There are men in Mississippi who are willing to . . .employ the
negro and pay him a fair reward for his services. But a great portion
of the people of Mississippi are not of large enough views ...
They wish to control the negro and his labor in such a way that he
will be compelled to remain with them for never less than a year,
and upon their own terms. 94
This theme was sounded throughout the hearings.95 It was reported, for
example, that one planter had demanded that workers "sign a contract to
work for him during their lifetime."9' Other planters agreed to a standard
92. The Civil Rights Act, which was introduced on January 5, 1866, was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee and reported out one week later, without any hearings. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866). The Joint Committee had been charged with investigating the conditions
prevailing in the South, id. at 24-30, 47, 57, 60-62, 69, and it was that committee which commenced
hearings on January 22. Transcripts of these hearings were available and mentioned during the de-
bates on the Civil Rights Act, id. at 1267, and they were printed and widely disseminated prior to the
vote on overriding President Johnson's veto. Id. at 1407-13. See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
93. H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. ii, at 142.
94. JOURNAL, supra note 53, at 274-75.
95. If the Freedmen could be compelled in practice to work only for their former masters, or if
planters could agree on standard terms and conditions of employment, there could be no free market
for labor. Former masters generally were willing to go through the motions of "contracting" with the
Freedmen for their labor, at low wages and subject to onerous conditions. The testimony also showed
that planters were unwilling to pay to the Freedmen the same wages paid to white workers or even
the amount that had been paid before the war for loaned slaves. H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. i, at 107-08; pt. ii, at 13, 30, 51-55, 175, 182, 210, 226-27, 234; pt. iii, at 6-12, 41-46, 103,
126, 143, 150; pt. iv, at 37, 46, 69, 88, 116. Because they balked at paying fair wages (with many
refusing to pay any wages at all), there was no possibility that the Freedmen would be able to con-
tract meaningfully to sell their labor. JOURNAL, supra note 53, at 274-75 (Major Gen. Edward
Hatch).
In addition, the testimony confirmed that violence frequently was used to compel the Freedmen to
work for their former masters: "[F]reedmen [who] have gone from one county to another and made
contracts , . . were brought back by men with their faces blackened, who whipped them and ordered
them not to leave again . . . even when they were under no contract with their former masters." H.R.
REP. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. iii at 143; see also id. pt. iii at 8 (testimony concerning
violence by private parties); pt. iv at 77, 83 (same).
96. H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. ii, at 228; see also id. pt. iv, at 116 ("The old
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form of contract designed to insure that the debts of a Freedman would
equal or exceed his wages.97 In short, planters saw the labor contract as a
means of perpetuating slavery under a different name.
Similarly, the testimony concerning the Freedmen's ability to purchase
land also focused on problems involving private conduct. Except in Mis-
sissippi, the problem was not that the Freedmen were prohibited by law
from purchasing or renting land, but that "[f]ormer slave owners [simply]
will not lease or sell land to negroes."' 8 In other words, the right to
purchase or rent real estate was not technically withheld as a legal matter,
but that right was worthless as a practical matter because white
Southerners were not willing to deal with the Freedmen, and frequently
agreed together not to do so.99
In sum, a substantial portion of the evidence before the Thirty-ninth
Congress showed, as the Freedmen's Bureau explained, that "[s]lavery
they have given up in the old form, but they want to subdue and keep in a
low place the negroes, by some compulsion which it seems . they are
trying to effect . . privately . . . ."'0 The Freedmen were to be free,
"but free only to labor."1 1 As Professor Hyman has suggested, the mem-
bers of the Thirty-ninth Congress were practical men who had little inter-
est in "[slystematic constitutional theories as bases for comprehensive leg-
islative schemes."' 01 2 But they were confronted with a serious practical
problem: how to construct and implement a new labor system that was
contrary to the deepest and most long-standing mores, customs, and prac-
tices of the South, the strength of which depended not simply, or even
principally, on law, but on the most deeply held values of white society.
IV. THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE
The Civil Rights Act of 1866108 was enacted to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment, which, in turn, was adopted to abolish slavery as a practical
master was not inclined to treat them differently from what he did when they were slaves. . . The
old planters were very unwilling to come down and make bargains in good faith").
97. Id. pt. i, at 107; pt. ii, at 270; pt. iii, at 7, 80, 124-25; pt. iv, at 9.
98. Id. pt. iii, at 122.
99. Id. pt. ii, at 149, 154, 235-36, 243; pt. iii, at 6, 25-27, 30, 36, 45, 62, 66, 71, 101, 151; pt. iv,
at 10, 56, 62, 69, 117.
100. Id. pt. ii, at 243.
101. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 134 (quoting Louisville Democrat newspaper).
102. H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 302.
103. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), conferred citizenship on native-
born blacks and then provided that:
Such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude ... shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties ...any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
In Sections 2 and 3, Congress provided for criminal penalties and for the removal of suits to federal
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matter, and not simply to still the legal machinery of slavery.104 Section 1
of the Act broadly prohibited all discrimination in civil rights or immuni-
ties, based on "race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude," and proclaimed that all persons shall
have certain equal civil rights, "any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom to the contrary notwithstanding. 1 0 5 At the outset, the logical ge-
ography of this language bears some discussion. The main thrust of Sec-
tion 1, like that of the Thirteenth Amendment itself, is to define the
Freedman's new status and rights. It is an "absolute declaration" of
rights, rather than "a mere prohibition" of conduct.106
On the other hand, the enumeration of agencies prohibited from abridg-
ing those rights, which is contained in the final clause of Section 1, plainly
reflects a secondary purpose. From a logical standpoint, Section 1 would
invest the Freedman with the same rights even if the final clause had not
been included. Thus, the final clause serves to emphasize, illustrate, and
clarify the full scope of the rights created, by identifying agencies whose
authority has been superseded by Congress' creation of these rights. In no
sense, however, is the enumeration of those agencies essential to the crea-
tion of the rights themselves. The final clause proclaims that nothing, not
even laws to the contrary, can prevail against the rights created in Section
1. Certainly, there is nothing in the structure of Section 1 to suggest that
Congress intended to limit those rights by including the final clause.1
07
At all events, the language of the final clause, together with the sweep-
ing language contained in the rest of Section 1, serves to underscore Con-
gress' understanding that slavery was an economic institution, as well as a
legal institution, and that it was rooted in the custom and private prac-
court. Id.; see S. KuTrLER, supra note 10, at 148-49.
104. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308 (1880) (exclusion of blacks from jury service "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the
law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to
securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others").
105. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
106. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (describing Thirteenth Amendment).
107. In this respect, it is necessary to consider Justice White's dissent in Runyon, in which he
argued, based on a reviser's note, that Congress substantively amended Section 1 of The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 by enacting the Revised Statutes of 1874. 427 U.S. 160, 195 n.6 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting). However, the note upon which Justice White relied was written and published after the
enactment of the Revised Statutes of 1874, see 18 Stat. 113 (1874), and thus has no bearing on
congressional intent. Moreover, it is clear that Congress intended no substantive alteration of existing
'law when it enacted the Revised Statutes. After receiving the original commission's draft in 1872,
Congress recognized that it would be "utterly impossible to carry the measure," if it altered existing
law in any way, and therefore engaged a new reviser, Thomas Jefferson Durant, to ensure against
any such change. See 2 CONG. REc. H646-50 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1874); 17 Stat. 579.
The need for avoiding any substantive change was reiterated by the sponsors. See, e.g., 2 CONG.
REC. H647 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1874) (Rep. Dawes) (expressing concern that existing statutes be
tnanged in meaning and scepticism that revisions could be made without inadvertant change in mean-
ing); id. at 647-48 (Rep, Poland); id. at 648-49 (Rep. Hoar). Moreover, Representative Lawrence
specifically noted that there was no intention to alter the substance of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. 2 CONG. REC. H827 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1874).
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tices, as well as the law, of the Southern states.' Viewed in this light,
Congress' inclusion of the word "custom" in the Act is critically signifi-
cant. As Robert Kohl has persuasively argued, the word "custom" can be
read, logically and unambiguously, to mean "the 'custom' of white
supremacy."' 1 9 Whatever other connotations may be carried by the word
"custom," the word certainly connotes private action, and its inclusion
therefore reinforces Congress' intention to reach private conduct under the
Act.
It makes little sense to suggest, as some commentators have done," 0
that Congress intended in these circumstances to use the word "custom"
only as a further reference to official action. First, that narrow reading
appears inconsistent with the available evidence of contemporary usage,
which shows that "custom" was used in the mid-nineteenth century to
encompass purely private conduct. For example, during the Gold Rush in
1851, the miners' private rules covering contract, property, and possession
were adopted into California law with the following language: "[P]roof
shall be admitted of the customs, usages, or regulations established and in
force at the bar, or diggings, embracing such claim; and such customs,
usages, or regulations, when not in conflict with the constitution and laws
of this State, shall govern the decision of the action.""' Closer home,
"ccustom" was used in precisely the same sense by Texas planter Frank B.
Conner, who wrote to a family member in 1867 that planters should fix
pay scales, and that anyone "breaking the established custom should be
driven from the community."
m2
Other examples could be given, but these should suffice to show that
the essence of "custom" is private action. Indeed, it was Justice Harlan's
candid recognition of that fact that required him to suggest in Jones that
Congress may have intended to reach private discriminations, but only
those "which were legitimated by a state or community sanction suffi-
ciently powerful to deserve the name 'custom.' ""s Justice Harlan's for-
mulation, which narrows the definition of "custom" to encompass only
those private actions which have the effective force of law, is not grounded
in the legislative materials," 4 but rather in Justice Harlan's intellectual
108. Professor Hyman has noted that "the black codes educated northern whites to facts long
familiar to slaves, slaveowners, and abolitionists, teaching that slavery was never a simple relation-
ship." H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 418. "Over two centuries, numerous incidental customary and
statutory constraints and disabilities had borne down on the slave in order that the master's property
rights and social control remain unimpaired." Id.
109. Kohl, supra note 36, at 289.
110. See, e.g., 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 36, at 1238-44; see also Jones, 392 U.s. at 471-73
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. Civil Practice Act of California of 1851, § 621, quoted in J. GRAY, supra note 13, at
296-97.
112. E. FONER, supra note 10, at 139 (quoting Letter from Frank B. Conner to Lemuel P.
Conner (Sept. 26, 1866)).
113. Jones, 392 U.S. at 457 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114. In support of his theory, Justice Harlan pointed only to the fact that Congress used the
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need to reconcile Congress' clear intention to reach some private action
with his general "state action" approach to the statute. 115 However, this
preoccupation with the modern dichotomy between the public and the pri-
vate spheres, which has become central to Fourteenth Amendment analy-
sis, has never been applied to the Thirteenth Amendment, under which
the Civil Rights Act was enacted. Indeed, the doctrinal importance of this
dichotomy was not manifest in 1866,1"6 and probably did not become clear
until 1883, when the Supreme Court decided The Civil Rights Cases.1
7
Thus, it is not surprising that the congressional debates do not belabor the
point." 8 Indeed, even to ask, in these circumstances, whether Congress
additional word "prejudice" in the Freedmen's Bureau bill. Id. As previously noted, however, there is
no discussion in the legislative history to show that Congress intended any significance to be attached
to this slight verbal variation. See supra note 64.
115. That crabbed definition of custom is inconsistent with evidence of nineteenth-century usage.
See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. It is also inconsistent with modern usage. When we
speak of custom, we mean conduct which is approved or tolerated in varying degrees by various
segments of society, not simply conduct which is so well or universally endorsed as to constitute law in
all but name. Illegal practices, such as bid-rigging or bribery, may be sufficiently acceptable to (or at
least tolerated by) certain segments of society as to constitute customs at various times or places, but
they cannot, by definition, have the force of law. Moreover, a custom is a dynamic social phenomenon
which necessarily carries varying degrees of authority during its natural life cycle. See, e.g., A.
MILNE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DivERsrrY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 113 (1986).
116. Legislators like Senator Trumbull looked at the world in a less complicated way when they
asserted, quite simply, that the purpose of the Act was to "break down all discrimination between
black men and white men." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866). Ignoring the import of
such statements, the state action theorists nonetheless pronounce the Section 1 legislative materials as
insufficient to show that Congress affirmatively intended to take the truly exceptional (to them) step
of reaching private action. They then buttress their argument with the assertion that Congress was too
mindful of states' rights and laissez-faire principles to have targeted private discrimination.
Laissez-faire was directly invoked, however, only by President Johnson in his veto message. 6 J.
RICHARDSON, supra note 47, at 406-13 (vetoing bill because it interferes with "relations between
inhabitants"). Moreover, the Freedmen's Bureau already was deeply involved in many of the same
private liability matters that would pass to the federal courts under the Civil Rights Act. Bureau
officials attempted to offer redress to Freedmen who had been robbed, assaulted, or denied wages by
whites. In addition, Bureau officials (sometimes to the disadvantage of the Freedmen) had been sub-
stantially involved in the formation and enforcement of individual labor contracts. E. FONER, Supra
note 10, at 149
117. 109 U.S. at 20 (Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only governmental interference with con-
stitutional rights). The Civil Rights Cases effectively ended Reconstruction by validating the Compro-
mise of 1877. See C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 70, at 245; Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory:
A Casenute on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1300-01 (1982); Goodman,
Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA.
L. REv. 1331, 1332-34 (1982). The complicated relationship between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments is a subject that lies beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
Professor tenBroek concluded, based on his study of the legislative materials relating to the Fourteenth
Amendment, that "the protection intended [under the Fourteenth Amendment] was not merely against
state action." J. TENBROEK, supra note 36, at 186; see also H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 439
("Almost no one anticipated, when formulating the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 or when ratifying
the Fifteenth in 1870, that the rights specified in both postwar amendments would be interpreted to
affect only the public acts of the small number of the state officials rather than private actions.").
118. In his dissent in Jones, Justice Harlan noted that Congress had spent a great deal of time
debating the imposition of federal obligations upon state officials, and that little time was devoted to
the applicability of the statute to purely private action. Jones, 392 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). From this fact, Justice Harlan essentially concluded that Congress' silence on the "more diffi-
cult" case of private discrimination indicated its lack of intent to reach it. In 1866, however, it was the
imposition of federal obligations upon state officials, not the proscription of private discrimination,
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intended to reach private as well as official discrimination may be a cate-
gory mistake.119
Finally, Congress' inclusion of the word "custom" in the text of the Act
is particularly significant because courts in the nineteenth century con-
strued statutes by looking to the statutory language and the general his-
tory of the times, rather than to specific fragments of the legislative de-
bates.' 20 Indeed, Senator Sherman insisted during the debates that the
meaning of the Act was plain on its face, that it defined:
the incidents of freedom, and [assured] that these men must be pro-
tected in certain rights, and so careful is it in its language that it goes
on and defines those rights, the right to sue and be sued, to plead
and be impleaded, to acquire and hold property, and other universal
incidents of freedom.1
2'
To limit enforcement of the Act to cases in which the denial of freedom
was accomplished by state action not only would have made those "inci-
dents of freedom" far from universal, but would have rendered the word
"custom" mere surplusage. Thus, we should presume that Congress in-
cluded the word "custom," knowing what it meant in common usage, and
intending that it would be given that meaning by the courts.1 22 In other
that would have seemed the more difficult case. See In re Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
66 (1861); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Kaczorowski, supra note 36, at
62-63. In addition, of course, Congress was very concerned about the imposition of federal criminal
liability, a novel occurrence in the nineteenth century, when the federal criminal code was virtually
non-existent, and criminal law was thought to be the responsibility of the states. See infra note 138.
119. See G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16-17 (1949). To frame the question in that way is
to indulge in a category mistake because it focuses the issue in a way quite foreign to the framers,
who, unlike us, were not required to view the issue through the lens of modern Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis. When that category mistake is properly understood, there is little force to the sugges-
tion that the legislative materials are insufficient to show that Congress affirmatively intended to take
the truly exceptional step of reaching private action. Viewed in its own light, rather than ours, the
step is far less exceptional.
120. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. As Holmes put it: "We do not inquire what the
legislature meant, we ask only what the statute means." Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 419 (1898-99). See also United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385,
396 (1868) ("If the language be clear it is conclusive. There can be no construction where there is
nothing to construe.").
121. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 744 (1866).
122. The narrow reading also sounds hollow in light of the way in which the heart of the prob-
lem was explained to Congress, both in the Schurz and Howard reports and in the hearings before the
Joint Committee. See supra notes 78-91 and accompanying text. As Robert Kohl has noted, "(tihe
Joint Committee found many instances where private individuals refused to sell or lease land to Ne-
groes, not because they feared any 'community sanctions' but because such sales would establish a
'precedent,' or because of such private scruples as 'repugnance,' adverse 'feeling,' 'instinct,' or 'senti-
ment.' " Kohl, supra note 36, at 289.
Clearly, the "conservative" aspect of this legislation was that it was aimed at securing only "civil
rights," and not "political rights" (such as suffrage) or "social rights." But Congress intended, with
respect to civil rights, that the Freedmen should have the "same right . . . as is enjoyed by white
persons .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Congress' aim was to secure practical equality, not the kind
of formalistic equality described by one of Anatole France's characters in Le Lys Rouge, prohibiting
rich and poor alike from sleeping under bridges, A. FRANCE, THE Six GREATEST NovELs OF
ANATOLE FRANCE 837 (W. Stephens trans. 1909), and there is no evidence in the legislative history
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words, it seems likely that the Supreme Court, had it been required to
construe Section 1981 at the time it was first enacted, would not have
gone beyond the text itself to conclude that it reached private action.
V. THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES OF 1866
The course of the 1866 debates has been recounted at length in the
Court's prior opinions.123 This section will not rehearse the legislative his-
tory in full, but will confine itself to examining several key points, which
will place in context the fragments that have been invoked by one side or
the other.
First, the need for legislation to deal with subversion of the Freedmen's
rights, whether by private or official forces, was a theme sounded
throughout the debates. Indeed, even before he introduced the bill, Senator
Trumbull stated that it was intended to deal with the danger that "by
local legislation or a prevailing public sentiment in some of the States
persons of the African race should continue to be oppressed ... .
Later, Trumbull observed that the bill was not intended to punish "[s]tate
officers, especially, but everybody who violates the law."12 In this respect,
it is also telling that Trumbull earlier had opposed a bill proposed by
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, 2 ' which would have prohibited
only discriminatory laws, because Wilson's bill did not go far enough. 2 '
The aim of Trumbull's bill was to "secure[] freedom in fact."' 128 Likewise,
Representative James Wilson of Iowa argued that "[l]aws barbaric and
treatment inhuman are the rewards meted out by our white enemies to
our colored friends. We should put a stop to this at once and forever." '29
These statements were not mere rhetorical flourishes; they evinced an un-
to suggest that Congress feared intruding upon private economic relationships. Admittedly, the line to
be drawn between "social" and "economic" relationships may not always be obvious, but that seems
to have been a detail that Congress left for the courts. See H. HYMAN, supra note 41, at 227 ("Far
better for Congress to let judges bear ultimate responsibility"); see also M. BAXTER, DANIEL WEB-
STER & THE SUPREME COURT 35 (1966); S. KuTrrER, supra note 10, at 126; G. WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 178-99 (1976); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Seg-
regation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59-65 (1955); Levinson, New Perspectives on the Recon-
struction Court, 26 STAN. L. REv. 461, 483 (1974).
Moreover, there is no question as to Congress' intention to create a private right of action when it
enacted Section 1. In the nineteenth century, it was commonly recognized that "in every case, where a
statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same
statute for the thing enacted for his advantage. . . ." Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & B1. 402, 411, 118 Eng.
Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q.B. 1854). Accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S.
353, 374-76 (1982); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Thus, it is necessary
to read Section 1 as a free-standing provision.
123. See, e.g., Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100, 131-36 (1981) (White, J., concurring); Jones,
393 U.S. at 422-37.
124. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 500 (1866).
126. S. 9, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 39 (1865).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 30 th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865).
128. Id. at 476 (1866).
129. Id. at 1118 (emphasis added).
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derstanding of the need to reach the evil itself, not simply its official
manifestation.
Second, Congress widely discussed the information received from the
Schurz and Howard reports, and from the hearings of the Joint Commit-
tee,130 all of which showed that the problem to be remedied was more
subtle than de jure discrimination." 1 For example, Senator Sumner re-
ported that former slave owners in South Carolina had agreed in public
meetings not to rent lands to the Freedmen or "to contract with any freed-
man unless he can produce a certificate of regular discharge from his for-
mer owner." ' 2 It is against the background of such reports that we must
read statements such as Trumbull's, that "[iut is idle to say that a man is
free who cannot go and come at pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who
cannot enforce his rights . ..which the first clause of the [Thirteenth]
Amendment meant to secure to all. 1 33 What was at issue, as Senator
Sumner put it, was the relegation of the Freedmen to "a condition of
practical slavery. "134
Third, the fact that a large part of the actual debate was concerned
with discriminatory state action is subject to misinterpretation. For exam-
ple, it is beyond dispute that Congress was genuinely concerned with the
Black Codes that were being enacted by "the controlling class in the in-
surgent States," as Representative James Wilson referred to the govern-
ments established under Presidential Reconstruction. 5 In addition, it is
certainly true that Congress was genuinely concerned about issues of fed-
130. See, e.g., id. at 39-40 (Sen. Wilson) (Freedmen worse off in most respects than they were as
slaves); id. at 93-95 (Sen. Sumner) (concerted activities by planters to prevent free labor market and
refusal of planters to pay wages); id. at 1159-60 (Rep. Windom) (purpose of bill is "to secure to a
poor, weak class of laborers the right to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the
payment of their wages, 2nd the means of holding and enjoying the proceeds of their toil"); id. at
1833-35 (Rep. Lawrence) (quoting extensively from accounts of private violence and discrimination
against blacks); id. at 1838-39 (Rep. Clarke) ("Every mail brings to us the records of injustice and
outrage"); id. at 1267 (Rep. Raymond), 1839 (Rep. Clarke) (citing Joint Committee testimony and
Schurz report).
131. Laws are enacted by societies to enforce values that might not otherwise be espoused. See,
e.g., E. SHILs, TRADITION 189 (1981) ("Legislation was a great invention for the changing of society
in accordance with procedural rules and within the framework of the written or unwritten constitu-
tion. Legislation is intended to institute changes which will change tradition but which become tradi-
tions once they have been made."); see also 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 134 (1833) (discussing "the dangers of legislation [enacted upon mere theoryJ
without consulting the habits, manners, feelings, and opinions of the people"). If values can be en-
forced without positive law, because of the strength of custom or the degree of social approbation
given to certain conduct, there may be no need for law, and the distinction between public and private
action lacks real consequence. In addition, certain conduct, which is neither prohibited nor required
by law, may be widely approved or tolerated by certain segments of society, so that certain values may
be promoted, wholly outside the realm of positive law, and, indeed, without the need for any concerted
social action or enforcement. In those circumstances as well, the distinction between public and private
action may be meaningless.
132. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1865).
133. Id. at 43.
134. Id. at 127; see also supra notes 69-70, 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing absence of
congressional emphasis on distinction between public and private spheres).
135. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866).
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eralism."'3 But to focus narrowly on these references to state laws, as
some commentators have done,137 misses the fact that the real issue was
whether the federal government should be involved in local criminal jus-
tice matters. The debates indicate that some members of Congress had
serious concerns that the Act signalled an expansion of federal criminal
jurisdiction. These concerns stemmed not from a reluctance to commit the
federal government to the protection of civil rights, but from an apprecia-
tion of the extremely limited role which the federal government had taken
in criminal law since the founding of the Republic.'" Thus, for example,
Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio expressed concern that the bill
represented "the terrors of the penal code within organized States.' u 9
Congress' concern about sailing these uncharted seas is not surprising.
Nor is it surprising that these areas received substantial attention during
the debates. It would be a mistake, however, to infer from the forensic
prominence of these subjects that Congress was uninterested in private
discrimination, or that it did not intend to reach private discrimination
under the Act. In this respect, it is important to recognize that the agenda
for the debates largely was set by the opponents of the bill, who focused
on two issues: the nullification of state laws and the imposition of federal
criminal penalties on state officials.'4 By and large, the proponents of the
Act directed their fire at answering those arguments.
Some opponents of the Act did recognize its broad sweep, and specifi-
cally objected that it would reach purely private conduct. 41 For example,
Senator Garett Davis of Kentucky, in a frequently cited passage, observed
that the purpose of the Act was to strike down "discriminations . ..
against the negro race" in most of the states "made by their constitutions
136. Kaczorowski, supra note 36, at 60.
137. See, e.g., 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 36, at 1214 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 476 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull) (Act would "have no operation in any State where the laws are
equal, where all persons have the same civil rights without regard to color or race.")). It is noteworthy
that Fairman's writings give little weight to recent historical research and analysis.
138. In 1812, the Supreme Court held that there was no federal common law of crimes cognizable
in the federal courts. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812); accord United
States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816); see Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part
Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1292, 1299 (1985). In addition, there was little federal criminal
statutory law. See G. MUELLER, CRIME, LAW AND THE ScHoLARs 32-33 (1969) (there was no
"orderly system of federal criminal laws" until 1897); D. Flanigan, The Criminal Law of Slavery
and Freedom: 1800-1868, at 364 (May 1973) (Ph.D. dissertation available through University Mi-
crofilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan) (southern justices of the peace sat at apex of in'ensely local systems
.of criminal justice). If anything, Congress simply underestimated the actual amount of federal activity
that would be required to accomplish its goals. Thus, Senator Trumbull predicted that fining and
imprisoning "one or two in a State, and the most prominent ones I should hope at that," would
"break up this whole business." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866).
139. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1292.
140. See, e.g., id. at 1120-23 (Rep. Rogers) ("Has Congress the power to enter the domain of a
State, and destroy its police regulations with regard to the punishment inflicted upon negroes?").
141. Id. at 1268 (Rep. Kerr); id. at 1416 (Sen. Davis). In addition, President Johnson made the
point in his veto message. 6 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 47, at 412-13 (criticizing bill for interfering
with relations between "inhabitants").
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and statutes ... ,""' But when )avis, a Democrat, proceeded to list ex-
amples of discrimination that would violate the Act, he included: provid-
ing "softly cushioned pews" for whites in churches, assigning to whites
the best cabins on steamships, and segregating travellers by race "on rail-
roads, national, local and street."' 43 Although these specific examples may
well have exceeded the intentions of the bill's supporters, those proponents
(lid not contradict Davis's assertion that the Act would reach private ac-
tion. In sum, Democrats objected to the bill on the ground that it would
work a revolution in American law, 1" but that, as Senator Morrill ob-
served, was precisely what was required in the midst of a revolution."'
VI. CONC.USION
The Thirty-ninth Congress was committed to securing "practical free-
dom" for the Freedmen. The historical materials show that Congress' at-
tention was not focused entirely on the official acts of truculent Southern
judges, legislators, and other public officials. Nor was Congress concerned
only with statutes that discriminated in explicit terms against the Freed-
men. On the contrary, Congress was well aware of the role played by
private discrimination in the South's recalcitrant refusal to accept the nec-
essary consequences of the Civil War, and it intended to provide a remedy
for such discrimination. Furthermore, since it was acting pursuant to the
Thirteenth Amendment, Congress was not doctrinally obligated to parse
the public and private qualities of the obstacles which white Southerners
were bent on interposing in the path of Congress' legislative goals.
As in most matters of historical interpretation, there is room for debate.
If due regard is to be paid to the historical materials, however, and if
precedents are to be overruled only on the clearest evidence that the Court
previously has misperceived the intent of Congress, there is no proper
ground for overruling Runyon. The historical evidence does not show that
the Court erred "beyond doubt"' 4 when it held in Runyon that the
Thirty-ninth Congress intended to reach private discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.
142- (CONe;. (;101tt., 39111 (:<)g., lst SCSS. 1416 (1866).
141. Id, at 18909, App. 181 8M.
144 Id at Y) (Sen. )avis) ("llere lce honoralble Senator ITruinltolll in one short lill hreak%
down all tlie domestic Systems of law that prevail in all tihe states, ... -and he breaks down all lite
penal law% that inflict plnishnwcnt cr penally ulmn all the lceocple of tie States exc'ept so lfar ,as thoe
law% shall Ie uniflrn in their aplication.").
14S. Id. at 1291. When introducing the hill in the louse, Representative Jane. Wilco, olberved
thato "the practice cof tihe States leaves us no acvecn e of eCape, and we most do our dity by ,tpplying
thc irotctioc) which Ilhe States deny." Id. at 1118. see also id. at 77 (Sen. Trumbull) (under ille
Thirteenth Anicehncettn "(Congrcv is hcound to see that freecdor is in fact secured tco every cer,,on
throl hlo i t e land"l)
16 I ccccc v. l'alr, 365 It.S. 167. 192 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring); see supia ntes 17 12
anld c, ctpon,,ying text (rxlcining signific.nce of f larlan's reasoning)
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